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Certain methods of analysis require the knowledge of the spatial distances
between entities whose data are stored in a microdata table. For instance,
such knowledge is necessary and sufficient to perform data mining tasks such as
nearest neighbour searches or clustering. However, when inter-record distances
are published in addition to the microdata for research purposes, the risk
of identity disclosure has to be taken into consideration again. In order to
tackle this problem, we introduce a flexible graph model for microdata in a
metric space and propose a linkage attack based on realistic assumptions of
a data snooper’s background knowledge. This attack is based on the idea of
finding a maximum approximate common subgraph of two vertex-labelled and
edge-weighted graphs. By adapting a standard argument from algorithmic
graph theory to our setup, this task is transformed to the maximum clique
detection problem in a corresponding product graph. Using a toy example and
experimental results on simulated data show that publishing even approximate
distances could increase the risk of identity disclosure unreasonably.
Keywords: Anonymity, identity disclosure, linkage attack, maximum approximate com-
mon subgraph problem
1 Introduction
Enriching microdata with spatial information opens up numerous additional approaches
for analysis. In the area of epidemiology, this insight goes back at least to the middle of
the 19th century when John Snow identified a contaminated water pump in London as
the source of a cholera outbreak by linking the cases of mortality to their location and
visualising these locations and the positions of surrounding water pumps on a map [34].
In recent years, spatial analysis techniques have become increasingly attractive in the
social sciences as well [30]. However, when personal microdata containing sensitive infor-
mation (e.g., gathered in a survey or health study) are published for research purposes,
the anonymity of the individuals has to be guaranteed. It has been pointed out in [15] that
location is often one of the critical pieces of information for a successful re-identification
attack. Therefore, usually only microdata that contain spatial information in an aggre-
gated form are released, which restricts the choice of applicable techniques for analysis
drastically.
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In particular, distance calculations that are based on aggregated data become difficult
and imprecise [3], especially for entities that are closely related. Since many data mining
techniques and methods in spatial analysis require accurate distance computations, it is
necessary to investigate the extent to which additionally published (approximate) inter-
record distances influence the risk of identity disclosure and how a possible non-acceptable
increase of this risk can be prevented. Our work presented in this article provides a novel
approach for tackling these questions.
Contributions of the paper
We introduce a flexible natural graph model for microdata with known inter-record dis-
tances. The search for a maximum common subgraph between two such graph models
is interpreted as a novel kind of linkage attack on such microdata. We discuss the rel-
ative merits of our method in comparison to the usual linkage attacks on the basis of a
small-scale example (example 10 in section 4).
Furthermore, in the special case of geographical distances, it is shown that, on the basis
of simulated data, a non-negligible risk of identity disclosure exists if N (0, σ2)-distributed
Gaussian noise is added to the input coordinates for too small values of σ. For larger values
of σ (which lead to sufficiently anonymised data), however, the data become nearly useless
for further analysis. These results reflect a trade-off between data utility and disclosure
risk through the proposed attack.
Organisation of the paper
In section 2, we refer to related work. The preparatory work is given in section 3 as well as
a graph model for microdata in a metric space which forms the basis of the graph theoretic
linkage attack introduced in section 4. In section 5, this attack is evaluated by means of
a simulation study. We conclude and discuss the possible directions for future research in
section 6.
2 Related work
Statistical disclosure control and privacy preserving data mining
As already indicated in the introductory section above, the original motivation for the
work presented in this article stems back to the wish to also make the wide variety of
distance-based methods (e.g. from spatial statistics) applicable for microdata that are
published for scientific purposes. Since it is intuitively compelling that naive release of the
exact distances between individuals can increase the risk of deanonymisation, the interest
question, however, is how might the knowledge of approximate distances change the risk
of identity disclosure, i.e. the chance of a data snooper attempting to identify some of the
entities.
In general, the analysis of such deanonymisation attacks on microdata and the develop-
ment of tools for their anonymisation is a central topic of statistical disclosure control [21].
It is universally acknowledged that a necessary but insufficient first step during the process
of anonymisation consists in the removal of all attributes that can be used to identify an
individual entity unambiguously (this step is usually referred to as deidentification). Such
attributes (e.g., social insurance number) are called (direct) identifiers, in contrast to
quasi-identifiers, which do not have the power to nullify an individual’s anonymity on their
own, a distinction which has to be ascribed to Dalenius [12].
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By using a combination of quasi-identifiers, however, it might be possible to assign an
entity from the underlying population to a specific record of a published microdata file
unambigously. For example, in [35] it was shown that based on 1990 US census data, 87%
of the population of the United States are uniquely determined by their values with respect
to the quasi-identifier set {5-digit ZIP code, gender, date of birth}. This fact moti-
vates a mode of attack that is commonly referred to as linkage attack [14]: In this scenario,
it is assumed that a data snooper has access to an external auxiliary microdata file (called
identification file) containing both direct identifiers and quasi-identifiers as attributes. By
making use of the quasi-identifiers, the snooper attempts to identify entities by linking
records from the identification file to records from the published microdata file (termed
target file). A real-life example of linkage via quasi-identifiers is due to Sweeney [36]:
She was able to detect the record corresponding to the governor of Massachusetts in a
published health data file by linkage with a publicly obtainable voter registration list.
Even though theoretical results on linkage attacks were recently obtained in [28], the
concept of k-anonymity had already been proposed as a remedy against linkage attacks
in [33]. The basic idea of k-anonymity is to modify the records in the released microdata
such that every record coincides with at least k − 1 other records with respect to the
quasi-identifiers. For this reason, an unambiguous linkage between the identification and
target file will not be possible. The graph theoretic linkage attack introduced in section
4 contains the classical linkage attack via quasi-identifiers as a subroutine, however, it
provides a way to resolve at least some of the ambiguous matches.
Several papers on privacy preserving data mining have already discussed privacy issues
with respect to the distance-preserving transformations of microdata. However, in these
articles it is generally assumed that the considered distances can be directly calculated from
the microdata, whereas our focus is on microdata enriched with supplementary distances
between the entities that cannot be calculated from the microdata itself. Moreover, in
most cases only specific kinds of distances have been considered (e.g., `1-distance in [32]
or the Euclidean (i.e. `2-) distance in [27]).
In contrast, the attack proposed in this paper can be applied to any kind of distance
function (notwithstanding that the special case of spatial distances motivated our research
and is exclusively referred to in our examples). Furthermore, a distance-preserving tech-
nique for the anonymisation of binary vectors is discussed in [23]. In contrast to our
approach, in that article the distance information alone is not assumed to increase the risk
of identity disclosure.
Location privacy and geographical masks
There is a vast literature on the problem of identity disclosure when dealing with spatially
referenced data. The opportunities and challenges with regard to spatial data in the
context of social sciences are discussed in great detail in [19] and [20].
Articles [5] and [11] give illustrative examples of how naive publishing of spatially ref-
erenced data can lead to a violation of anonymity: In both cases, the respective authors
were able to reconstruct many of the original addresses successfully from published low
resolution maps. A currently flourishing branch of research deals with anonymisation
techniques for datasets containing mobility traces of individuals [17] (e.g., obtained via
mobile phone tracking). This topic is usually referred to as location privacy [25].
In this article, however, we consider the deanonymisation risk that arises from the
knowledge of the (approximate) distances between fixed spatial points assigned to the
entities in a microdata table. Various methods for the anonymisation of geographic point
3
data (not necessarily taking additional covariates into consideration as in our case) have
been discussed under the term of geographical masks. [1] and [29] provide comprehensive
outlines of the existing methods.
A noteworthy method is due to Wieland et al. [37], who developed a method based on
linear programming that moves each point in the dataset as little as possible under a given
quantitative risk of re-identification. However, the aim of nearly all proposed anonymisa-
tion techniques for spatially referenced data consists in distorting the spatial distribution
with respect to the underlying geographical area as little as possible, whereas attempts
predominantly focusing on the preservation of distances have not yet been discussed in
the context of spatial data. It appears to be obvious that neglecting the underlying geo-
graphical area might yield more accurate results regarding distance calculations.
Social network anonymisation
The use of a graph model in this article might suggest a strong connection between our
approach and the methods discussed in the area of social network anonymisation [38].
However, we model the microdata with known inter-record distances using a complete
graph with vertex labels and edge weights, which is a very specific model in contrast to
the more general graph models commonly used in social network analysis.
Indeed, the graphs modelling social networks are usually a long way off from being
complete and their edges are not usually weighted. For example, in [7] the underlying
graph model considers discrete edge labels instead of real valued weights only.
Furthermore, active attacks (consisting in the addition of nodes to the published network
by an intruder) as in [2] do not seem to be sensible when investigating the risk of identity
disclosure for published microdata. However, the active attack proposed in [2] is related
to the one in this paper because it also makes use of graph algorithmic building blocks. It
consists in the detection of a subgraph in a larger graph, whereas the attack in this paper
is based on finding the common subgraphs of two different graphs.
Pattern recognition
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to make use of a graph model for
a microdata file and the distances between its records. Finding a matching between two
such graph models constitutes the basic principle of the graph theoretic linkage attack
proposed in this article and is an often considered problem in the pattern recognition field
and its various areas of application (see [8] as a source providing an extensive outline).
Fundamental to our presentation is the article by Levi [26], which motivates to transform
the problem of finding the (maximum) common subgraphs of two graphs into a (maximum)
clique detection problem, and its adaption in [16] where the original approach by Levi
has been relaxed in order to deal with approximate common subgraphs as well. This
transformation to the maximum clique detection problem is of particular interest due
to its various fields of application (e.g. biochemistry [16]). The problem of finding a
maximum clique in a graph is known to be NP-hard [18] and a great deal of attention
has been paid to the development of techniques for solving this problem either exactly or
at least approximately [4]. For the simulation study in section 5 of this paper, we made
use of the maximum clique detection algorithm introduced by Konc and Janežič in [24].
Exploring the limits of our approach in view of its scalability towards very large files is
postponed to future research.
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3 A graph model for microdata in a metric space
Preliminaries
Ametric space is a pair (X, d), whereX is a set and d is a (distance) function d : X×X → R
satisfying the following three conditions: (i) d(x, x) = 0 and d(x, y) > 0 whenever x 6= y,
(ii) d(x, y) = d(y, x) and (iii) d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) + d(z, y).
We assume that the deduplicated microdata table T at hand contains information with
respect to an attribute set A := {A1, . . . , Am} about NT ∈ N entities from an underlying
population. The fact that the distances between the entities of T are known can be
modelled in mathematical terms by means of a function τ : [NT ] := {1, . . . , NT } → (X, d),
i 7→ τ(i) which maps the ith record/entity of T to a point τ(i) in a metric space X such
that the distance between records i and j of T is equal to dij := d(τ(i), τ(j)). The distances
between all the entities can then be stored in the N ×N distance matrix D = (dij). Such
a pair (T,D) is hereafter referred to as microdata in a metric space.
Note that we did not state any assumptions on the function τ such as injectivity or
surjectivity. It is easy to see that [NT ] itself becomes a metric space by the pullback
of d via τ if and only if τ is injective (see page 81 in [13]). In general, [NT ] becomes a
pseudometric space only. From our point of view, this flexibility regarding τ is intended as
the records of a microdata table often only form a pseudometric instead of a metric space,
which is illustrated by the following example: Consider microdata about individuals which
have been gathered in a scientific survey. If two respondents share a common residence,
the geographical distance between these respondents will be equal to zero and thus the set
of respondents with the related distances between them forms a pseudometric space only.
Thus, the distance matrix D is not assumed to be a proper distance matrix, i.e. zeroes
outside the diagonal are permitted.
Some terms from graph theory
Given a set S, we denote the set of its two-element subsets by [S]2. A (simple undirected)
graph G = (V,E) consists of a set V (whose elements are termed vertices) and a set
E ⊆ [V ]2 of edges. The cardinality |V | of V is called the order of G. Two distinct vertices
v and w of V are adjacent if {v, w} ∈ E. The existence of an edge between v and w
will sometimes be denoted by vw ∈ E as a shorthand. A graph is called complete if any
two of its vertices are adjacent. A graph G′ = (V ′, E′) with V ′ ⊆ V and E′ ⊆ [V ′]2 ∩ E
is a subgraph of G = (V,E). If E′ = [V ′]2 ∩ E holds, the graph G′ is called an induced
subgraph of G or we say that the subset V ′ of vertices induces G′ in G which is denoted
by G′ = G[V ′]. A subset of the vertex set V is a clique if the subgraph induced by these
vertices is complete. A clique containing k elements is termed a k-clique. A clique is
maximal if it is not contained in a larger clique. A clique is maximum if there is no
other clique containing more vertices. Clearly, a maximum clique is always maximal, but
generally not vice versa.
The notion of a vertex-labelled and edge-weighted graph is of fundamental importance
to the graph model for microdata in a metric space introduced below. This notion is just
a special case of the more general notion of an attributed graph which is frequently used
in the pattern recognition community [6].
Definition 1. Let LV be a set of vertex labels. A vertex-labelled and edge-weighted
graph is a four-tuple G = (V,E, λ, ω), where V is the vertex set, E ⊆ [V ]2 the edge set,
λ : V → LV the vertex-labelling function and ω : E → R a weight function which assigns
real numbers to the edges.
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The graph model
Let (T,D) be microdata in a metric space and NT the number of records in T as above.
An associated vertex-labelled and edge-weighted graph G = G(T,D) = (V,E, λ, ω) can
be defined as follows: Set V = {1, . . . , NT }, E = [V ]2 and define ωE : E → R via
ωE(ij) = dij := d(τ(i), τ(j)); the labelling function λV : V → LV assigns a certain part
of the information stored in T for a record to the corresponding vertex of the graph G
(see example 2 below). Note that the simple undirected graph Gsimple := (V,E) obtained
from G by forgetting vertex labels and edge weights is the complete graph KNT with NT
vertices. This graph theoretical structure appears adequate for modelling microdata in
a metric space: Loops, i.e. edges linking a vertex with itself, are not necessary because
dii = 0 for any vertex i ∈ V and undirected edges are sufficient for reflecting the distance
from the corresponding edge weights due to the symmetry dij = dji of the distance matrix
D = (dij). Obviously, it would be easy to widen this model, e.g. by introducing directed
edges, if this were necessary for a specific application.
Example 2. Consider the imaginary microdata provided by table 1 containing personal
microdata with respect to the attributes name, sex, birth location and year of birth.
The function τ maps each individual to the geographic coordinates (longitude λ and lati-
tude θ in degrees) of the correspoding birth location with respect to the World Geographic
System WGS 84, i.e.
τ(1) = (−0.1198244, 51.51121) (Alice was born in London)
τ(2) = (2.3522219, 48.85661) (Bob was born in Paris)
τ(3) = (−3.7037902, 40.41678) (Eve was born in Madrid)
τ(4) = (13.4049540, 52.52001) (Walter was born in Berlin)
Assuming a spherical shape with radius R = 6371 km for the earth and converting
degrees to radians, the geographical distance d between two locations (λ1, θ1), (λ2, θ2) can
be calculated as d = R · φ where
cosφ = sin θ1 sin θ2 + cos θ1 cos θ2 cos(λ1 − λ2).
Using this formula leads to the following distance matrix D:
D = (dij) =

0 343.6 1264.0 930.9
343.6 0 1052.9 877.5
1264.0 1052.9 0 1869.1
930.9 877.5 1869.1 0
 .
The corresponding graph model is then given by V = {1, 2, 3, 4}, E = [V ]2 and the
edge weights are defined via ω(ij) = dij = dji. We define the vertex labelling function by
assigning the information regarding the attributes sex and year of birth to each vertex,
i.e. formally, we have λV : V → dom(sex)× dom(yob).
The resulting vertex-labelled and edge-weighted graph can be visualised as in figure 1.
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name sex birth location year of birth
Alice f London 1978
Bob m Paris 1965
Eve f Madrid 1943
Walter m Berlin 1931
Table 1: Example microdata table. The table
contains the attributes name, sex, birth
location and year of birth.
344
1264
931
1053
877
1869
1978
1965
1943
1931
Figure 1: The graph model for the example micro-
data. The attribute sex is indicated by
the colour of the vertex labels.
4 A graph theoretic linkage attack
Prerequisites for the attack
In order to make any kind of linkage attack with the objective of identity disclosure, we
have to at least presuppose that an appropriate external microdata file is available to the
data snooper.
Assumption 3. The snooper is in possession of an identification file containing direct
identifiers.
Under this assumption, classical linkage attacks based on comparisons considering the
quasi-identifiers of the identification and target file can be conducted. As already men-
tioned in section 2, in the literature on the deanonymisation of microdata, these represent
an important mode of attack aimed at identity disclosure. In order to perform a linkage
attack that goes beyond the ordinary ones described above by also taking the information
given by the pairwise distances between the records into consideration, we have to expand
the setup by a second assumption.
Assumption 4. The snooper is able to calculate the distances between the entities in the
identification file at least approximately.
Although in some cases assumption 4 might not be fulfilled, it is easy to find examples of
when this would indeed be the case. For instance, when the target file containing survey
data is enriched by the geographic distances between the respondents’ residences, we
assume that the snooper can geocode the addresses of the individuals in the identification
file and calculate the corresponding distance matrix. In this example, there will be some
dependence on the methods used for geocoding and distance calculation, a fact which
has to be considered in the creation of an attack mode. Analogously, any modification
of the distances in the target file to be carried out by the data holder for the purpose of
anonymisation will have to be taken into consideration.
Approximate common subgraphs
Due to assumptions 3 and 4, a data snooper can create a vertex-labelled and edge-weighted
graph as defined in section 3 for both the target and identification file. At this step, the
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snooper will only consider the common quasi-identifiers of both files for the definition of
the vertex labels because a comparison of records can only be based on such attributes.
Hereafter, the resulting graphs will be referred to as the target and identification graph.
Hence, classical linkage attacks consist in trying to find vertices in the target graph
for each vertex in the identification graph that result in matches for the accompanying
vertex labels. In the parlance of graph theory, this approach is equivalent to the search
for common subgraphs of order 1, a notion which will be made precise below. This course
of action will usually (e.g., if the target file satisfies k-anonymity for some k > 1) lead to
ties, that cannot be broken without extra information.
However, due to the additional information given by the edge weights in the graph
model, the snooper is able to search for complete common subgraphs of order > 1, which
forms the essence of our attack. It is intuitively apparent that taking edge weights into con-
sideration increases a snooper’s chances of evaluating the credibility of potential matches.
For instance, if we consider vertices v1, v2 in the target graph G1 = (V,E, λV , ωE) and
w1, w2 in the identification graph G2 = (W,F, λW , ωF ) such that λV (v1) = λW (w1) and
λV (v2) = λW (w2), we observe coincidence regarding the vertex labels. If the correspond-
ing edge weights ωE(v1v2) and ωF (w1w2) are at least approximately equal (denoted by
ωE(v1v2) ≈ ωF (w1w2)), this fact will augment the credibility of the two matches (v1, w1)
and (v2, w2). Conversely, a large distortion with respect to the corresponding edge weights
will reduce this credibility: In this case, at least one of the considered matches should be
false. These considerations can easily be generalised to more than two matches and all
accompanying edge weights. The more potential matches preserve all the accompanying
edge weights, the more the credibility of all these potential matches will increase. This
motivates the snooper to identify nearly identical substructures in both graphs which are
as large as possible.
As indicated above, it seems convenient to allow some deviation with respect to the edge
weights in this context due to deviations which cannot be circumvented by a snooper (as
mentioned in the special case of geographic distances above). All of these considerations
can be dealt with rigorously using the notion of an approximate common subgraph of two
vertex-labelled and edge-weighted graphs. This notion is made precise by means of the
following definition:
Definition 5. Let G1 = (V,E, λV , ωE) and G2 = (W,F, λW , ωF ) be two vertex-labelled
and edge-weighted graphs in the sense of definition 1. An approximate common subgraph
of G1 and G2 is given by subsets S ⊆ V , T ⊆ W and a bijection ϕ : S → T such that the
following two statements are true:
(i) λV (s) = λW (ϕ(s)) for all s ∈ S.
(ii) For all s1, s2 ∈ S we have either
(a) s1s2 ∈ E, ϕ(s1)ϕ(s2) ∈ F and ωE(s1s2) ≈ ωF (ϕ(s1)ϕ(s2)), or
(b) s1s2 /∈ E and ϕ(s1)ϕ(s2) /∈ F .
Condition (ii) of definition 5 guarantees that vertices v1, v2 ∈ V can only be mapped
to vertices w1, w2 ∈ W if either both pairs of vertices are adjacent or non-adjacent (the
non-adjacency even yields a sufficient condition for making such a mapping possible).
Since we only consider complete graphs in this article, only requirement (a) in condition
(ii) has to be checked because requirement (b) will never be fulfilled. Furthermore, the
interpretation of ≈ in definition 5 has to be made precise depending on the prevailing
situation and especially on the possible perturbations of the distances caused by the data
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holder before publishing the microdata. This issue will be dealt with in detail in example 10
in this section and the simulation study in section 5. It would have certainly been possible
to allow some amount of deviation regarding the vertex labels as well by introducing a
similarity measure on the set of vertex labels. In this paper, however, we do not deal with
this aspect. We require exact coincidence for the labels of two vertices to be matched since
we are primarily interested in the effect of how publishing (perturbed) distances influences
the risk of identity disclosure.
The product graph
In order to tackle the problem of finding approximate common subgraphs of two vertex-
labelled and edge-weighted graphs G1 and G2, we transform this problem to a clique detec-
tion problem in an appropriately defined simple undirected graph G⊗, the product graph
of G1 and G2.
Definition 6. Let G1 = (V,E, λV , ωE) and G2 = (W,F, λW , ωF ) be two vertex-labelled
and edge-weighted graphs as in definition 1. The product graph G⊗ = (V⊗, E⊗) of G1 and
G2 is a simple undirected graph defined through
V⊗ = {(v, w) ∈ V ×W : λV (v) = λW (w)} and
E⊗ =
{
{(v1, w1), (v2, w2)} : v1 6= v2, w1 6= w2 and either (a) v1v2 ∈ E,w1w2 ∈ F and
ωE(v1v2) ≈ ωF (w1w2), or (b) v1v2 /∈ E and w1w2 /∈ F
}
.
The announced transformation of the maximum approximate common subgraph prob-
lem into the maximum clique problem is achieved via the following theorem:
Theorem 7. Consider the setup of definition 6. There is a one-to-one correspondence
between the approximate common subgraphs of order k and k-cliques of G⊗.
Proof. Let an approximate common subgraph of G1 and G2 of order k be given by the
vertex sets S = {v1, . . . , vk} ⊆ V and T = {w1, . . . , wk} ⊆ W , respectively. Without loss
of generality, we assume ϕ(vi) = wi for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} under the corresponding subgraph
isomorphism ϕ. Condition (i) in definition 5 yields (vi, wi) ∈ V⊗ for i = 1, . . . , k. Moreover,
for distinct i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} we have vivj ∈ E ⇔ wiwj ∈ F . If vivj ∈ E condition (ii) in
definition 5 implies that ωE(vivj) ≈ ωF (ϕ(vi)ϕ(vj)) = ωF (wiwj) and (vi, wi) and (vj , wj)
are adjacent in G⊗. Because i, j were chosen arbitrarily, C := {(v1, w1), . . . , (vk, wk)} forms
a k-clique in G⊗.
Conversely, let C be a k-clique in G⊗ given by vertices (v1, w1), . . . , (vk, wk) ∈ V⊗. We
define S = {v1, . . . , vk}, T = {w1, . . . , wk} and ϕ : S → T via ϕ(vi) = wi. Then ϕ is a
bijection and we obtain λV (vi) = λW (wi) = λW (ϕ(vi)) for i = 1, . . . , k. Thus, condition
(i) in definition 5 is satisfied. The validity of the second condition follows from the fact
that either vivj /∈ E and wiwj /∈ F or vivj ∈ E and wiwj ∈ F and that we have ωE(vivj) ≈
ωF (wiwj) = ωF (ϕ(vi)ϕ(vj)) in the latter case.
Corollary 8. The problem of finding a maximum approximate common subgraph of two
vertex-labelled and edge-weighted graphs is equivalent to the problem of detecting a maxi-
mum clique in the associated product graph.
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Before putting all the ingredients discussed so far together, we want to make some
remarks regarding theorem 7, which is folklore within the pattern recognition commu-
nity. The first time that the correspondence between common subgraphs of two graphs
and the cliques in the corresponding product graph was considered was in [26] for exact
isomorphisms between simple graphs including vertex labels. Since then, this approach
has become a standard tool for tackling graph matching problems in various fields of
application [8].
The definition of the product graph recently presented in [16] is equivalent to the one
we use in this paper. However, in that paper the authors relax the concept of a clique
(which appears to be too restrictive for their application) to the less restrictive concept of
a γ-quasi-clique and propose an algorithm for quasi-clique detection based on local clique
merging.
For our application only requirement (a) in the construction of the edge set E⊗ is relevant
since we deal with complete graphs only. The condition that v1 6= v2 and w1 6= w2 in the
construction of E⊗ guarantees that the cliques in the product graph correspond to one-
to-one matches between the vertices of the two graphs to be matched. For complete
graphs without loops, this condition is implicitly part of the requirement that ωE(v1v2) ≈
ωF (w1w2). If we had permitted loops in our graph model and assigned a weight of 0 to
each of these loops, v1 6= v2 and w1 6= w2 would have been necessary in order to keep the
statement of theorem 7 true, which is illustrated by the following example:
Example 9. Consider G1 = (V,E, λV , ωE) given by V = {1}. Then, necessarily E = ∅
and ωE is redundant. We consider the product graph G⊗ of G1 with G2 = (W,F, λW , ωF )
where W = {2, 3}, F = {{2, 3}} and ωF ({2, 3}) = ε2 for some ε > 0. Moreover, we assume
that λV (1) = λW (2) = λW (3). Thus, the vertex set V⊗ of the product graph is given
by V⊗ = {(1, 2), (1, 3)}. Let us define that two edge weights are approximately the same
if the absolute value of their difference is less than ε. Then, according to our definition
of the edge set E⊗ the two vertices from V⊗ are not adjacent because they coincide in
their first component. Without the condition v1 6= v2 and w1 6= w2 and allowing loops of
zero weight in the graph models, however, these two vertices would have been adjacent.
Obviously, in this case the resulting clique C = V⊗ would not be related to an approximate
common subgraph of G1 and G2.
Overview
Let us now formulate the overall graph theoretic linkage attack.
Graph Theoretic Linkage Attack on Microdata in a Metric Space
INPUT Target data (T1, D1), identification data (T2, D2)
OUTPUT List of matches between records from T1 and T2
1. Build target graph G1 from (T1, D1).
2. Build identification graph G2 from (T2, D2) (possible under assumptions 3 and 4).
3. Build product graph G⊗ (requires reasonable definition of ≈).
4. Find a maximum clique Cmax in G⊗ (using some maximum clique detection algo-
rithm).
5. Extract matches from Cmax.
Let us make a brief comment on step 4 of the attack: As already indicated in section 2,
there is a vast literature concerning the problem of maximum clique detection in graphs.
A systematic comparison of the prevalent techniques to tackle this problem in the context
of our application goes beyond the scope of this paper and is postponed to future research.
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To conclude this section, we illustrate the process of the proposed graph theoretic linkage
attack using a small-scale example which makes use of the data summarised in appendix
A.
Example 10. Consider microdata table 6 in appendix A, which contains information
about various important European poets. This table is anonymised by removing the direct
identifier name, generalising the attribute yob (year of birth) to cob (century of birth) and
removing the information about the birth location (loc). The attribute language remains
unchanged. This yields anonymised table 7 in appendix A.
While the spatial information loc has been deleted from this table, the distance matrix
D1 (see appendix A) containing the geographic distances between the birth locations is
meant to be published in addition to table 7. We assume that the snooper is in possession of
the identification microdata in table 8, i.e. the attributes cob and language serve as quasi-
identifiers. By geocoding the birth locations and calculating the geographic distances, the
snooper obtains the distance matrix D2. Graph models G1 and G2 for the target and
identification data can be built by using this information and are visualised in figure 2.
Table 2 lists all the possible matches if the snooper takes only the vertex labels into
consideration. These eleven matches form the vertex set of the product graph as well.
Note that this set would already constitute the final outcome of a linkage attack where
the distances are not taken into consideration.
14
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Figure 2: Graph models for target (left) and identification (right) microdata in example 10. The layout
of the graphs was chosen such that the edge lengths give an approximate indication of the
distances. The attribute language is indicated by the vertex label colour, whereas the attribute
cob is indicated by the vertex label itself.
For the construction of the product graph, we allow an absolute deviation of five
kilometers with respect to the edge weights, i.e. we define ωE(v1v2) ≈ ωF (w1w2) ⇔
|ωE(v1v2) − ωF (w1w2)| < 5.1 This definition of ≈ leads to the product graph shown in
figure 3.
1We previously mentioned that allowing such a deviation is already necessary because of errors that
appear due to the fact that the data holder and snooper generally use different methods for geocoding
and distance computation. This fact was also addressed in this example by geocoding the birth locations
of the target microdata via Wikipedia and the birth locations of the identification file by means of the
command geocode provided by the R package ggmap.
11
vertex of product graph rownumber target file rownumber identification file
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 6 3
5 4 4
6 7 4
7 3 6
8 6 6
9 4 7
10 7 7
11 2 9
Table 2: Possible matches between tables 7 and 8 with respect to the quasi-identifiers cob and language
only, i.e. vertex labels in the accompanying graph models.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Figure 3: Product graph in example 10.
As can be easily seen from figure 3, the product graph contains a unique maximum
clique C := {1, 2, 3, 5}. Therefore, a snooper following the protocol of the graph theoretic
linkage attack would accept the potential matches in rows 1,2,3 and 5 in table 2 as matches
and reject the remaining ones.
Although example 10 is artificial, it illustrates some of the phenomena that also appear
when real-world data are taken into consideration:
• The definition of ≈ has to be chosen carefully. In the present example, distances
between cities scattered all over the European continent are considered so that even
the rather rough definition above (allowing for an absolute deviation of five kilome-
ters) will yield a useful result. In general, the definition of ≈ has to be chosen such
that as many common edges as possible of the target and identification graph are
detected correctly, i.e. not classifying too many edges as approximately the same
that are actually different. The definition of ≈ will be studied in greater detail as
part of the simulation study in section 5.
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• A successful match of the respective first records of both tables would have already
been possible unambiguously without the additional distance information because
both records are unique in their tables with respect to the corresponding quasi-
identifiers. Nevertheless, using the additional distance information increases the
credibility for this specific matching, which is now not only supported by the coin-
cidence of the quasi-identifiers but also by the coincidence of the distances to other
matches.
• However, in certain cases unambiguous matching is only possible because of the
additional information about the distances. For example, record 3 of the target
table could be matched with records 3 and 6 of the identification table only by
taking the quasi-identifiers into consideration. This tie is resolved in our example
by the extra information given by the edge weights.
• Evidently, in practise there will be ties in the data that cannot be resolved by our
method either. In our example, the records 9 and 10 of the target file do not differ
according to their quasi-identifiers, however, they also cannot be distinguished by
considering the distances to these records because the corresponding point locations
(loc=Paris in both cases) coincide.
• Finally, the attack has reduced the number of matches from eleven in table 2 to
four. These matches indeed correspond to the actual overlap of the target and
identification file.
Our toy example has shown that publishing inter-record distances might increase the
risk of identity disclosure for microdata files. We confirm this result in the following section
by investigating the effect of random noise addition to the input coordinates, which is a
standard technique for the anonymisation of spatial point data.
5 Experimental results
Data
The data for the simulation study were generated as follows: In the first step, addresses
from the German telephone book were sampled at random. Subsequently, geographic lat-
itudes and longitudes based on the World Geodetic System 1984 were assigned to these
addresses using the geocode command from the R package ggmap [22]. Finally, the ge-
ographic distances between the addresses were calculated to obtain the corresponding
distance matrix.
We randomly assigned the points of the resulting metric spaces to example microdata
containing (besides an ID) attributes concerning gender and age, which served as quasi-
identifiers in our experiments. The attribute values were sampled in accordance with the
actual distribution of these attributes derived during the German census 2011.2
We generated data where both the size N1 of the target and N2 of the identification
file where equal to 500. The overlap Ncommon of common records was chosen equal to 50.
The target and the identification file are visualised in figure 4. Note that the classification
with respect to age (eleven age intervals) is rather rough; this guaranteed the existence of
many duplicates with respect to the quasi-identifiers in our test microdata, which would
2These demographic statistics can be downloaded from https://ergebnisse.zensus2011.de/
auswertungsdb/download?pdf=00&tableId=BEV_1_1_1&locale=DE.
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Figure 4: Test data for the simulation study: Both the target (left) and identification file (right) contain
500 records of which 50 are common. Quasi-identifiers (age, gender) were sampled according
to the actual distribution of these attributes due to the demographic statistics derived during
the German census in 2011. Without the additionally released approximate distances the target
file can be regarded as sufficiently anonymised: a classical linkage attack leads to a set of 15517
potential matches between the target and identification file.
result in ties when performing a classical linkage attack. Indeed, the order of the resulting
product graph was equal to |V⊗| = 15517.
Perturbation technique
A standard technique for the anonymisation of spatial point data consists in the addition
of random noise to their coordinates (see section 3.2 in [1]). In this section, we consider the
performance of the proposed graph theoretical linkage attack under this anonymisation
technique. To be more precise, N (0, σ2)-distributed Gaussian noise was added to the
input coordinates of the target file before the distance matrix was calculated. Different
instances of the standard deviation σ were considered.
Fine-tuning of the attack
A suitable definition for the relation ≈ has to be found for the generation of the product
graph in the graph theoretical linkage attack. Following Kerckhoffs’ principle [31] (which
implies that the security of a cryptosystem/anonymisation technique must not depend on
the concealment of the algorithm in use), we assume that the data snooper knows that
Gaussian noise is added to the geographic coordinates before the distances are calculated
and, furthermore, that the standard deviation σ is known to him (the latter assumption
is in conformance with [1], who emphasise that all useful spatial analyses of masked data
require some knowledge about the characteristics of the mask used).
Under the assumption of a Euclidean distance function, the effect of random pertur-
bation of the input coordinates on the squared distances can be studied theoretically,
an approach which has been considered in [23]. Such a rigorous mathematical analysis
appears to be more difficult in the case of geographical distances. For this reason, we
assume that the snooper performs a little simulation study by which she/he investigates
the effect of perturbation by Gaussian noise to the calculation of distances. To imitate this
14
σ 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 sample variance
0.005 -1.1088 -0.8558 -0.4261 0.0226 0.4496 0.9256 1.2192 0.4799
0.010 -2.3909 -1.7191 -0.8750 0.0798 0.9733 1.8218 2.2642 1.9677
0.015 -3.3063 -2.4633 -1.2288 0.0810 1.4714 2.7492 3.4624 4.3312
0.020 -4.6132 -3.6261 -2.0787 -0.0615 1.7278 3.4013 4.3512 7.8732
0.025 -5.6147 -4.2924 -2.2826 -0.1592 2.2177 4.1254 5.3089 11.5378
0.030 -6.4952 -4.9210 -2.5024 0.1763 2.9190 5.2730 6.6511 16.1313
0.035 -8.3848 -6.2351 -3.0673 -0.0665 3.0206 6.0428 7.9411 23.6334
0.040 -9.1530 -6.7866 -3.7315 -0.1884 3.4698 7.0085 8.7236 30.2768
0.045 -11.0830 -8.2160 -4.1860 -0.0680 3.6953 7.6620 10.2638 39.6836
0.050 -11.4906 -8.9544 -4.7386 -0.0057 4.5955 8.6728 11.4998 48.8299
Table 3: Sample quantiles and variance of the considered distance deviation d−d′ for different values of σ.
course of action, we sampled 1000 pairs of points from the area of the Federal Republic
of Germany for each considered value of σ and compared the distances before and after
addition of Gaussian noise. Several sample quantiles and the sample variance (the latter
will only be used for the evaluation of our experiments) of the deviation of the distances
(which is defined as d− d′ where d denotes the original distance and d′ the distance after
perturbation) have been gathered and are recorded in table 3.
We use the empirical quantiles to define the interpretation of ≈: For a threshold param-
eter α ∈ (0, 1), we define that two edge weights satisfy the relation ≈ if the corresponding
deviation is greater than the empirical 1−α2 -quantile and smaller than the
1+α
2 -quantile for
the current value of σ. In this case, the distances from the identification file take on the
role of d and the distances from the target file the one of d′. The threshold parameter α
chosen by the snooper is supposed to guarantee that a common edge of the target and
identification graph is detected by the snooper with probability approximately equal to α.
Its effect will also be considered within this section.
Implementation
All the experiments reported here were performed using R and the exact maximum clique
detection algorithm proposed in [24].3 All the accompanying visualisations were created
in R.
Evaluation of the attack
The matches and non-matches between the target and identification file gathered by
the proposed graph theoretical linkage attack were classified as true positives (success-
ful deanonymisation), false positives (failed deanonymisation), false negatives (records
belonging to the same entity have been missed) and true negatives (records have been
correctly classified as belonging to distinct entities). The quality measures considered are
based on the number of true positives (TP), false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN).
More precisely, we consider
prec = TPTP+ FP (precision), and
rec = TPTP+ FN (recall),
which are two standard measures in the evaluation of data linkage processes [9].
3We adapted the C++ implementation of this algorithm, which is available from http://www.sicmm.
org/~konc/maxclique/, for our purposes.
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α | σ 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.035 0.040 0.045 0.050
0.1 0.7800 0.7215 0.3415 0.2752 0.3232 0.2193 0.1549 0.1571 0.1136 0.1584
0.2 0.9717 0.8929 0.8769 0.8229 0.7569 0.6121 0.5657 0.5094 0.4780 0.4785
0.3 0.9831 0.9513 0.9047 0.8502 0.8255 0.7728 0.6862 0.6567 0.6073 0.5975
0.4 0.9829 0.9558 0.9037 0.8700 0.8358 0.7766 0.7411 0.6651 0.6428 0.6410
0.5 0.9808 0.9458 0.9133 0.8721 0.8374 0.7834 0.7505 0.6832 0.6526 0.6274
0.6 0.9830 0.9436 0.9102 0.8725 0.8315 0.7780 0.7430 0.6974 0.6604 0.6229
0.7 0.9803 0.9405 0.9087 0.8675 0.8255 0.7707 0.7434 0.6948 0.6556 0.6086
0.8 0.9795 0.9373 0.9008 0.8539 0.8027 0.7666 0.7248 0.6894 0.6484 0.6065
0.9 0.9764 0.9304 0.8884 0.8351 0.7954 0.7513 0.7017 0.6605 0.6159 0.5876
Table 4: Average precision in dependence on the parameters σ and α over n = 100 repetitions.
α | σ 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.025 0.030 0.035 0.040 0.045 0.050
0.1 0.0664 0.0612 0.0302 0.0284 0.0326 0.0228 0.0168 0.0174 0.0130 0.0196
0.2 0.1166 0.1034 0.1126 0.1144 0.1120 0.0870 0.0864 0.0770 0.0714 0.0818
0.3 0.1586 0.1552 0.1556 0.1592 0.1642 0.1416 0.1398 0.1354 0.1292 0.1390
0.4 0.2084 0.2204 0.2112 0.2164 0.2162 0.1934 0.1966 0.1894 0.1828 0.2026
0.5 0.2774 0.2874 0.2754 0.2880 0.2722 0.2628 0.2526 0.2518 0.2404 0.2564
0.6 0.3622 0.3714 0.3308 0.3582 0.3364 0.3322 0.3166 0.3146 0.3084 0.3132
0.7 0.4402 0.4490 0.4250 0.4408 0.4198 0.4080 0.3976 0.3992 0.3754 0.3936
0.8 0.5638 0.5538 0.5420 0.5408 0.5096 0.5110 0.5204 0.5068 0.5104 0.4966
0.9 0.7202 0.7146 0.6960 0.6790 0.6568 0.6568 0.6838 0.6454 0.6658 0.6468
Table 5: Average recall in dependence on the parameters σ and α over n = 100 repetitions.
Simulation design and results
In our experiments, we varied the noise parameter σ as well as the threshold parameter
α. For each parameter setup, the simulation was repeated n = 100 times. The mean
of precision and recall over all iterations for the chosen parameter setups can be found
tables 4 and 5. Visualisations of these results can be found in figures 5 and 6. In addition,
typical outcomes of the graph theoretic linkage attack are visualised in figure 7.
Discussion
The main effect of the threshold parameter α concerns the recall. The probability of
detecting a common edge of the target and identification graph is approximately equal to
α. For this reason, higher values of α lead to a higher recall (see table 5 and figures 5
and 6).
Simultaneously, the effect of α on the precision appears to be twofold: On the one hand,
for increasing α a larger portion of the overlap between the identification and target file
can be successfully detected by the snooper, which makes false positives less likely (leading
to a larger precision). On the other hand, for too high values of α also the chance for
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Figure 5: Dependence of average precision (left) and recall (right) on the standard deviation σ for different
values of α (see tables 4 and 5).
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Figure 7: Typical results of the graph theoretic linkage attack for different combinations of the noise
parameter σ (chosen by the data holder of the target file) and the threshold parameter α (chosen
by the data snooper). Line segments between the target and identification file indicate matches
made by the data snooper (the green lines indicate true, the red ones false positives). Larger
values of α lead to more matches and a increase in recall, larger values of σ to a decrease in
precision.
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Figure 8: R-U confidentiality map: The risk is measured by the average precision, whereas the utility is
measured by the reciprocal of the sample variance in table 3. The threshold parameter α was
chosen equal to 0.5.
non-common edges of the target and identification graph (but which coincide with respect
to the vertex labels of their endpoints) to be classified as common edges increases leading
to a slight decrease in precision. The latter phenomenon, together with the increase in
recall for increasing α mentioned above, would reflect a trade-off between precision and
recall, which is a well-known phenomenon in data linkage [9]. Thus, combining these two
thoughts, for increasing α the precision should rapidly increase initially and then slightly
decrease when α becomes too large. This expectation is confirmed by our experiments
(see table 4 and figures 5 and 6), although the decrease in precision when α becomes too
large is not significant for the considered values of σ.
From the definition of ≈ (see the paragraph Fine-tuning of the attack above), it is
supposed that the recall does not change significantly in dependence on σ because the
probability of correctly detecting an edge should be nearly α (which is independent of
σ). This non-dependence is impressively confirmed by the performed simulations and
illustrated in figures 5 and 6. However, σ strongly influences the precision (for larger values
of σ the precision evidently decreases): The data snooper has to accept false positives
(resulting in less precision) if she/he wants to achieve a certain predetermined recall.
Altogether, the simulations show that, in principle, a sufficient level of anonymity can
be achieved by the addition of random noise to the input coordinates before computing
the distance matrix. However, this anonymity is not free, which is illustrated by means of
the risk-utility (R-U) confidentiality map in figure 8, where the risk of identity disclosure
(measured by the average precision of the linkage attack; see also the discussion below)
is plotted against the utility (measured as the reciprocal of the sample variance of the
distance deviation d− d′ for the current value of σ as recorded in table 3). In the datasets
considered in the simulation study σ would have to be chosen large enough to guarantee
at least some degree of anonymity, that useful analyses based on the distances would
become difficult. For this reason, the development of distance modification techniques
that guarantee a certain degree of anonymity, and make it possible to also conduct useful
analyses on the anonymised data, will be an important aspect of future research.
Note that in our specific example, the snooper would primarily attempt to achieve a
high precision: In the case of geographic distances, a point is uniquely determined by the
exact distances to three other points. If the snooper could deanonymise at least three
entities successfully, exploiting this fact would be a good starting point to identify even
more individuals. For arbitrary metric spaces, such a relationship does not hold in general,
albeit the successful deanonymisation of some entities would also alleviate a snooper’s work
in this more general case.
Obviously, for distance modification techniques other than perturbation of the input
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coordinates, a snooper will have to modify the graph theoretical linkage attack, especially
the definition of ≈. However, due to Kerckhoffs’ principle, it has to be assumed that the
snooper at least knows the distance modification technique used by the holder of the target
file and exploits this knowledge in the precise construction of the attack. For instance, if
noise is not added to the input coordinates before computing the distance matrix but rather
to the distance matrix itself (a technique discussed in [23]), the attack has to be slightly
adapted. In this case, when defining the relation ≈ the quantiles of the noise distribution
can be used directly, thereby making the empirical study on distance deviations originating
from perturbation of the input coordinates unnecessary. Moreover, in this specific case it
might be reasonable to further modify the attack by relaxing the (relatively strong) notion
of a maximum clique to the less restrictive notion of a maximum quasi-clique, a relaxation
which has been successfully applied in [16] for the purpose of protein classification. In
a similar way, our attack can be adapted to many other anonymisation techniques and
thus provides a useful and flexible tool for the analysis of methods for distance-preserving
anonymisation.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have introduced a novel graph theoretic linkage attack on microdata
with additionally published (approximate) inter-record distances. In the special case of
spatial distances, we have demonstrated – on the basis of our test data – that the release
of distances increases the risk of identity disclosure unreasonably even if geographical
coordinates have been perturbed by random Gaussian noise before the distances are cal-
culated. Furthermore, we showed that augmenting the standard deviation of the added
random noise will gradually lead to a sufficient level of anonymity, but also make the per-
turbed distances useless for further analysis. Therefore, the development and analysis of
anonymisation techniques for microdata in a metric space that guarantee a certain degree
of anonymity but distort the distances as little as possible (particularly with regard to the
applicability of data mining techniques) will be an important aspect of future research.
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A Example dataset: European poets
name yob language loc
1 Giovanni Boccaccio 1313 Italian Firenze
2 Miguel de Cervantes 1547 Spanish Alcala de Henares
3 Johann Wolfgang Goethe 1749 German Frankfurt am Main
4 Moliere 1622 French Paris
5 Dante Alighieri 1265 Italian Firenze
6 Friedrich Schiller 1759 German Marbach am Neckar
7 Jean-Baptiste Racine 1637 French La Ferte-Milon
8 William Shakespeare 1564 English Stratford-upon-Avon
9 Simone de Beauvoir 1908 French Paris
10 Jean-Paul Sartre 1905 French Paris
Table 6: Microdata containing information about famous European poets. The attribute yob contains the
year of birth, and loc the birth location of the poets.
cob language
1 14 Italian
2 16 Spanish
3 18 German
4 17 French
5 13 Italian
6 18 German
7 17 French
8 16 English
9 20 French
10 20 French
Table 7: The anonymised version of table 6 is obtained by removing the direct identifier name, generalising
the year of birth (yob) to century of birth (cob) and removing the birth location (loc).
The distances between birth locations loc are stored in the distance matrix D1:
D1 =

0 1261 729 886 0 593 864 1341 886 886
1261 0 1424 1034 1261 1369 1093 1307 1034 1034
729 1424 0 479 729 137 414 762 479 479
886 1034 479 0 886 507 67 469 0 0
0 1261 729 886 0 593 864 1341 886 886
593 1369 137 507 593 0 449 856 507 507
864 1093 414 67 864 449 0 478 67 67
1341 1307 762 469 1341 856 478 0 469 469
886 1034 479 0 886 507 67 469 0 0
886 1034 479 0 886 507 67 469 0 0

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name cob language loc
1 Giovanni Boccaccio 14 Italian Firenze
2 Miguel de Cervantes 16 Spanish Alcala de Henares
3 Johann Wolfgang Goethe 18 German Frankfurt am Main
4 Moliere 17 French Paris
5 James Joyce 19 English Dublin
6 Heinrich Heine 18 German Duesseldorf
7 Pierre Corneille 17 French Rouen
8 Publius Ovidius Naso -1 Latin Sulmona
9 Lope de Vega 16 Spanish Madrid
10 August Strindberg 19 Swedish Stockholm
Table 8: Identification microdata table used by the data snooper in example 10.
Geocoding of the locations from table 8 using the R package ggmap and calculation of
the mutual distances via the command spDists from the package sp yields the distance
matrix D2:
D2 =

0 1260 731 887 1666 894 999 291 1290 1791
1260 0 1423 1033 1446 1427 1055 1457 30 2574
731 1423 0 479 1091 183 551 983 1447 1188
887 1033 479 0 782 412 112 1177 1052 1546
1666 1446 1091 782 0 919 671 1956 1450 1633
894 1427 183 412 919 0 450 1156 1448 1149
999 1055 551 112 671 450 0 1290 1071 1548
291 1457 983 1177 1956 1156 1290 0 1487 1942
1290 30 1447 1052 1450 1448 1071 1487 0 2595
1791 2574 1188 1546 1633 1149 1548 1942 2595 0

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